The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) seems certain to evolve into a different entity following the sad disintegration development involving three of its members who have once again expressed determination to remain outside the block. This followed the six-month transitional period ECOWAS recently gave the countries, Mali, Niger Republic, and Burkina Faso. There is no doubt that the withdrawal of these three countries will likely have significant economic, diplomatic, and security repercussions for ECOWAS member states.
First, their exit is expected to disrupt the free flow of movement in the region, adversely affecting millions of Burkinabés, Malians, and Nigeriens living in other ECOWAS countries. This development is a substantial setback for a regional integration project that has spanned half a century. Despite its shortcomings, ECOWAS has been regarded as the most effective and economically integrated of all African regional blocs.
The President of the ECOWAS Commission, Omar Touray, has given the three countries a transitional period commencing from January 29, 2025, to July 29, 2025. This period aims to facilitate mediation and potentially reintegrate the countries into the bloc. Meanwhile, ECOWAS has extended the mandate of President Faure Gnassingbé of Togo and President Macky Sall of Senegal to continue their mediation efforts in bringing the three countries back to ECOWAS by the end of the transition period.
It is noteworthy that the military-led governments of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso had earlier announced their decision to withdraw from ECOWAS, describing the move as ‘irreversible.’ In a joint statement, the three Sahel nations accused ECOWAS of serving the interests of France, their former colonial power, and pledged to chart a new path for their citizens.
The disagreement between the three countries and ECOWAS has been heightened by official allegations that the Nigerian Army is sabotaging Niger Republic’s oil pipelines. The Nigerian Embassy in Niger was summoned by the Nigerien government over these allegations. Niger Republic has also questioned an alleged presence of French military bases in Nigeria, supposedly with the mission of attacking Niger Republic from Nigerian territory. Although Nigeria has refuted these allegations, the military leaders of the three countries have maintained their position to exit ECOWAS and established a new bloc — the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) — to replace ECOWAS. The AES has since vowed not to return to ECOWAS, arguing that ECOWAS is an instrument of neo-colonialism and a tool for imposing foreign rule in Africa.
Despite several efforts by ECOWAS leaders to bring the three countries back into the fold, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have largely rebuffed ECOWAS’ efforts to reverse their withdrawal, believing that their decision reflects stronger ties with Russia and signals a reshaping of the region’s diplomatic and economic landscape. Consequently, the chances of ECOWAS persuading these nations to return appear slim.
There is no doubt that ECOWAS’ threats against these countries were aimed at upholding democratic values. This stance underscores the bloc’s commitment to constitutional governance and its intent to discourage military takeovers. ECOWAS is concerned that the withdrawal of these countries could disrupt regional trade and mobility. The organisation facilitates the free movement of goods, people, and capital across its member states, while also operating under a shared currency, the CFA franc.
By taking a firm stance, ECOWAS signals to other member states that unconstitutional changes in government will have serious consequences. These actions align with international calls for democracy and human rights, bolstering ECOWAS’ credibility on the global stage. Sanctions could pressure junta leaders to negotiate and potentially restore civilian rule, thereby avoiding prolonged military governance. Restoring democratic governments would promote stability in the region, which is vital for economic development and security.
However, ECOWAS’ sanctions and threats may harm ordinary citizens, exacerbating poverty and worsening humanitarian conditions in the affected states. Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have declared that they have irreversibly formed alliances capable of resisting ECOWAS’ influence. Therefore, no hardline measures are likely to make the three countries change their stance.
With the threat of sanctions, ECOWAS risks being perceived as biased or heavy-handed, especially if it appears to favour certain political or economic interests. Military actions or economic sanctions could detract from efforts to combat terrorism in the Sahel, potentially worsening security challenges. Furthermore, military intervention could lead to prolonged conflict, further destabilising the region.
If ECOWAS insists on imposing sanctions, the junta governments may turn to external actors such as Russia, through the Wagner Group; or China, for support, thereby undermining ECOWAS’ influence and potentially introducing new geopolitical tensions into the region.
The withdrawal of these countries threatens to dismantle the shared regulatory environment, weaken cooperation, and reduce the region’s capacity to address critical challenges such as electricity shortages and environmental degradation.
Instead of imposing sanctions, which could backfire over time, ECOWAS leaders should focus on initiatives that foster dialogue, promote stability, and ensure sustainable development and economic prosperity in the region. The organisation should prioritise inclusive dialogue by reaffirming its commitment to the ECOWAS vision of an integrated and peaceful region. It should facilitate open and inclusive discussions between ECOWAS, the affected governments, opposition groups, and civil society.
ECOWAS should address the root causes of coups, such as corruption, poor governance, unrest, marginalisation, and security challenges, to build a more stable and democratic region. This includes providing technical assistance for transparent elections and strengthening institutions to uphold the rule of law. The organisation should proactively support efforts to prevent coups and unconstitutional changes in government by facilitating peaceful leadership transitions.
Additionally, ECOWAS should build coordinated efforts to combat coups, insurgencies, terrorism, and organised crime that destabilise the Sahel region. Its standby force could be empowered to provide training, funding, and logistical support to maintain regional peace.
In the immediacy, ECOWAS countries will do well to tighten their individual security architecture to avert dangers to which they are exposed by the intra-regional conflict. While there may be no alternative to regional cooperation, each country owes a duty to keep its territorial integrity from external aggression. By adopting these measures, ECOWAS can tackle the challenges that often lead to political instability and economic stagnation, ensuring long-term peace and prosperity for the region.
Guardian